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WAIVER OF DEFENSE CLAUSES IN THREE PARTY
CONSUMER CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS
There are two ways that an institution involved in the financing
of retail installment sales of consumer goods can enforce its claim for
payment against a purchaser in spite of his dispute with the mer-
chant over the conformity' of the goods: (1) it can claim holder in
due course status of the buyer's promissory note,' or (2) it can seek
to enforce a waiver of defense clause to which the purchaser has
agreed as part of his sales contract.' Issuers of three party consumer
credit cards' have thus far found it unnecessary to use either means,
since under the provisions of virtually all consumer protection legis-
lation they enjoy the status of lenders.' Lenders are not subject to
the borrower's defenses against the seller of goods which were bought
with the borrowed money. Nevertheless, credit cards issued by banks
generally contain waiver of defense clauses, perhaps in anticipation of
the possibility that these card transactions will lose their status as
consumer loans and will be considered as consumer credit sales. If this
happens then the issue of whether or not to enforce these waiver of
defense agreements will be squarely presented.
In the area of consumer credit sales, financers have witnessed
a slow but gradual loss of their status as holders in due course. Sim-
ilarly, their ability to enforce waiver of defense agreements against
consumers has been subject to increasing legislative restriction. This
comment examines the question whether the enforcement of waiver of
defense clauses should also be prohibited in the context of consumer
credit card transactions.
I. Section 9-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code
In the drafting of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the question of the consumer-buyer and his defenses against the sell-
er's assignee was a subject of great debate and controversy.' The
1 U.C.C. § 2-106(2) provides that goods or performance "conform" to the contract,
"when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract." All references
to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1962 official text.
2 U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-305(2).
3 U.C.C. g 9-206.
4 A 3-party credit card normally involves a bank or card company (the card
issuer), the person using the card (the cardholder), and a merchant who has contracted
with the issuer to honor the issuer's cards when presented and to sell the accounts
arising from the honoring of these cards to the issuer at a discounted rate. This should
be distinguished from a 2-party credit card issued by large department stores to their
customers. Since these large stores are in a position to finance the charges of their
customers without resorting to independent financing from an issuing company, the
relationship is directly between store and customer.
5 See generally Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered by Consumer-Credit
Legislation, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 463 (1967). Compare the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) § 2-104 (definition of a "consumer credit sale") with
U.C.C.C. § 3-104 (definition of a "consumer loan").
6 For an example of the legislative history surrounding the drafting of U.C.C.
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early drafts manifested an intent to protect the consumer against con-
tracting away these defenses by incorporating a specific prohibition
against waiver of defense clauses in Section 206 of Article 9.7 The
drafters ultimately decided, however, to leave such protection to the
courts of the individual states or to their respective Retail Install-
ment Sales Acts. 8
Proponents of waiver of defense clauses, banks and other financ-
ing institutions, argued that they were able to participate in the field
of consumer sales financing only by being free of the personal de-
fenses which a buyer might be able to assert against a seller. ° Those
who argued the consumer's cause reasoned that waiver clauses should
be made unenforceable by statute since no one would freely choose
to forego rights which under the appropriate circumstances might be
the only ones available."
Section 9-206, as ultimately drafted, gives a seller's assignee the
right to enforce "an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not
assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor . . . ."" Under section 9-206, an assignee
who seeks to enforce such an agreement must be one, "who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or
defense . . . ."" Because of the controversy engendered by attempting
to make such agreements enforceable against consumers, however,
section 9-206 makes enforceability in the consumer goods area, "sub-
ject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods . . . ."" In jurisdictions which
enforce waiver of defense clauses against consumers, "a buyer who
as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a
security agreement . . ."" waives his defenses by implication.
If the failure of the U.C.C. to adopt a uniform prohibition
against waiver agreements was a victory for those engaged in the fi-
nancing of consumer transactions, the victory has been subject to
legislative and judicial erosion with the passage of time. In Unico v.
Owen,' for example, after the court found that an assignee did not
§ 9-206, see New York Law Revision Commission, Report of the Law Revision Com-
mission and Record of Hearings on the U.C.C. 1018-1250 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
New York Report].
7 Id. at 1046-51.
8 See U.C.C. § 9-206(1) which contains the following proviso: "Subject to any
statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods ...."
9 New York Report 1105.
13 Id. at 1046-51.
11 U.C,C. § 9-206(1). Under this section a buyer can not contract away defenses
which, under U.C.C. § 3-305(2), would be good against a holder in due course.
12 Id.
13 Id.
19 Id.
13 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Among other cases denying holder in due
course status are Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
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qualify for holder in due course status because of its proximity to the
underlying sales transaction, it also struck down the waiver clause
written into the conditional sales contract as being against public
policy in consumer goods transactions." In view of the growing im-
portance of credit cards in consumer transactions, the problem of
whether or not to enforce waiver agreements has presented itself in
a new and important context. Part of the solution to the problem
involves the applicability of section 9-206 to three party consumer
credit cards. This applicability, in turn, depends on an examination
of the buyer-assignee relationship in consumer sales.
II. THE PROBLEM: BUYER V. ASSIGNEE
Many consumer items are purchased on a retail installment ba-
sis whereby the buyer makes periodic payments on the item until the
price is paid in full. The normal expectation of such a buyer is that
if this merchandise is defective he can stop making payments, de-
mand that any payments already made be returned, and return the
defective goods to the seller. If the merchant had himself held the
contract of sale and the promissory note, then the buyer's expecta-
tions would be fulfilled. This, however, is seldom the case.
In most instances the merchant, whose own limited capital re-
sources prevent him from financing these transactions, "discounts"
this promissory note ("chattel paper")" by selling it to a financing
institution for a price which is a certain percentage lower than the
price of the goods. This transaction involves an assignment of the
sales contract and a negotiation of the promissory note to the fi-
nancer, whereupon the buyer will receive notice to make his pay-
ments to the financer.
The problem arises when, owing to defective merchandise or to
some other default on the part of the seller, the purchaser withholds
his payments to the financing institution. The financer notifies the
buyer that continued failure to pay will Iead to legal action for the
balance of the purchase price or to repossession of the goods. Bar-
ring legislation to the contrary, section 9-206 gives the financer-as-
signee an option. Suit can be brought on the balance due free of the
buyer's claim against the seller if the financer qualifies as a holder
in due course of the buyer's promissory note." Secondly, the financer-
assignee may sue on the sales contract free of the buyer's claim,
1968); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968) ;
Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962) ; Commer-
cial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
16 50 N.J. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418.
17
 "Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods. When a transaction
is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a
series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper,
see U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (b), Comment 4.
18 U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-305(2).
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either because it contains an express waiver of defense clause, or
because the buyer's execution of a negotiable note and a security agree-
ment as part of the contract of sale is, under section 9-206, an implied-
in-law agreement by the buyer that he will not assert such claims
against an assignee of that contract.' In any event, the buyer will owe
the full purchase price on a purchased item which is unsatisfactory to
him.
To place the magnitude of the problem in its proper perspective,
however, it is accurate to say that most consumers are satisfied with
the goods or services which they have purchased. Even in the event
that they are not, most merchants choose to satisfy these complaints
with a credit for the returned merchandise or with an appropriate
price adjustment. Difficulties arise most often in the case of the low
income consumer who is forced to deal with merchants of question-
able business ethics who often deal in substandard goods. This type
of merchant may never intend to give satisfaction whether or not the
complaint is justified, and he may already have become insolvent or
disappeared by the time a product manifests a defect. Aside from
these situations, the issue arises again when a merchant decides that
the goods are not defective and thus refuses to give his customer sat-
isfaction for what he considers to be justifiable reasons.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 9-206 TO
BANK-ISSUED CONSUMER CREDIT CARDS
The credit card has already become a nationwide purchasing
instrument and is quickly replacing cash, checks, and various forms
of purchase money financing. The selection of goods and services
available to cardholders is extremely broad and credit card are ac-
cepted by restaurants, hotels, clothing and appliance stores, gas sta-
tions and airlines. Three party credit cards fall into three general
categories: travel and entertainment cards, oil company cards, and
bank-issued cards. 2°
With respect to the first two categories, the issue of enforcing
waiver of defense clauses has somewhat limited viability. Travel and
entertainment cards are invariably presented to merchants who deal
in services or in the type of goods in which defects will be immedi-
ately apparent. Most often these services have already been provided
before the card is presented for payment. In the case of dining, for
example, a dispute with a restaurant over the quality of the food or
service would in all likelihood be resolved before a cardholder made
his payment. If the customer's complaint was not remedied, he would
undoubtedly refuse to tender payment until his claim was settled.
19 U.C.C. § 9-206 provides: "A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both
a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement."
29 The three established travel and entertainment cards are American Express,
Diners' Club and Carte Blanche. BankAmericard and Master Charge comprise the
two major bank-issued card systems.
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When this cardholder does present his card for payment, any price
adjustments made in settlement of the dispute would be reflected in
the price of the goods or services.
The majority of oil company cards are presented to merchants
who are either lessees of the card-issuing corporation or are de facto
agents of the issuer by virtue of their identification with his prod-
ucts. Thus a breach of warranty" or some other nonconforming 22 per-
formance arising from a purchase from such a merchant might be
imputable to the issuer by virtue of this relationship. Under the ra-
tionale of section 9-206, the issuer could be denied the status of an
assignee taking without notice of a claim or defense, and could ac-
cordingly be denied the benefit of a waiver of defense clause." Fur-
thermore many oil company cards do not include waiver of defense
clauses.
Bank-issued cards, on the other hand, are often used to purchase
the type of consumer goods, like home appliances, in which defects
arise only after the sales transaction has been consummated. Unlike
travel and entertainment or oil company cards, both of which are
generally issued to middle or high income consumers," bank cards
are available to relatively low income purchasers who are more likely
to deal with unreliable merchants.'
Like retail installment sales, bank card programs operate on the
principle of facilitating the purchase of consumer goods or services
by delaying payment until some future time. At the time of the sale,
the cardholder presents his card to the merchant who imprints it on
a sales ticket. This record of the transaction is forwarded to the is-
suer, who pays the merchant in cash and in turn bills the cardholder.
The bank's primary financial interest in the transaction is two-
fold: (1) member merchants pay discounts of from 1 to 6 percent
on each card transaction slip which they sell to the bank, and (2)
cardholders pay finance charges on their purchases." The formula
for computing these charges is generally as follows: the cardholder
agrees that he will pay to the issuer the amount due within 25 days
of the billing date, either by paying the entire balance or an amount
equal to a designated percentage (5 to 10 percent) of the total
amount. If he chooses to defer his payments according to the latter
method, a carrying charge at rates which range up to 18 percent per
year is imposed."
21 See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 wherein the various warranties which may
arise from a sales transaction are explained.
22 See U.C.C. § 2-106(2).
23 U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
24 American Express, Diners' Club and Carte Blanche, for instance, require that
their applicants earn at least $7,500 per year. O'Neil, A Little Gift From Your Friendly
Banker, Life, March 27, 1970, at 50A [hereinafter cited as O'Neil].
24 Id. at 55; Hearings on Credit Cards Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insti-
tutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1968).
26 O'Neil 55.
27 Id. at 48.
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Bank credit card issuers include waiver of defense clauses as
part of their application forms, on separate information statements,
or in collateral material which accompanies the card at the time of
issue.28 Many banks include the agreement on the reverse side of the
card. By making this agreement, the cardholder waives and releases
the bank from all defenses, rights and claims which he may have
against the merchant. This agreement is identical with those invari-
ably incorporated into retail installment sales contracts. The only
difference between the two is that in the credit card transaction the
cardholder makes the agreement directly with the issuer, while in the
installment sale the waiver of defense promise is made to the mer-
chant for the ultimate benefit of the financer. If the legal relation-
ship between the merchant and the card issuer is characterized as
that of assignor-assignee, however, under section 9-206 both agree-
ments are identical. in purpose and effect.
Bank credit card transactions and retail installment sales are
identical in other respects: both the issuer of a card and the assignee
of a sales contract purchase the sales contracts of a merchant at a dis-
count, and both utilize interest charges on the outstanding balance of
the purchase price.
Whether section 9-206 applies to waiver of defense clauses in
bank credit cards as it does to retail installment sales contracts in-
volves three separate inquiries: (1) whether the applicable state re-
tail installment sales act covers credit card transactions; (2) whether
the card issuer's claim can be said to arise out of an assignment of
accounts rather than out of a direct obligation; and (3) whether any
line of case law has held waiver of defense clauses in consumer credit
sales to be unenforceable.
Apparently no state has enacted any legislation containing a spe-
cific prohibition against enforcing waiver agreements in credit card
sales. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.), recently en-
acted in Oklahoma and Utah," specifically excludes credit card trans-
actions from the definition of "consumer credit sale."3° Thus, although
U.C.C.C. Section 2-404 specifically makes waiver of defense clauses
unenforceable in the context of consumer credit sales," this is inap-
plicable to credit cards. Under the U.C.C.C., credit card sales fall
28 South, Legal Steps and Pitfalls in Bank Credit Cards, 87 Banking L.J., 222, 223
(1970).
20 Okla. Stat. Ann, tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. tit.
70B, $1 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969). Both states adopted the U.C.C.C., effective July 1,
1969.
8° U.C.C.C. 2-104(2)(a).
81 See U.C.C.C. § 2-404 (alternative A). Alternative B provides that waiver
clauses are enforceable if the assignee is not "related to" the seller. However, to enforce
such an agreement an assignee must notify the buyer of the assignment in writing. If
the assignee receives no such notice of a claim or defense within 90 days, he may enforce
the agreement. Oklahoma changed this statutory period to 30 days. See Okla. Stat.
Ann. fit. 14A, § 2-4.04(1) (Supp. 1969).
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within the statutory definition of "consumer loans,"" and lenders
(card issuers) are, of course, not subject to the borrower's defenses
against the seller of goods purchased with the borrowed money (credit
cards).
Notwithstanding the effect of the U.C.C.C., there is nothing to
prevent a court, if it characterizes the issuer's claim for payment as
one arising from an assignment of accounts, from prohibiting the
enforcement of these agreements in three party credit card sales.
This would comply with the statutory license which U.C.C. Section
9-206 gives to any judicial decision which "establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." 33
While a few states have enacted a legislative prohibition against
waiver of defense clauses in consumer installment purchases, some
states have imposed the same prohibition through judicial decision."
The most recent of these, Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly," relied
on the statutory license to adopt a different rule for consumers. 36 But
these cases arose out of the assignment of retail installment sales
contracts.
The only issue of possible legal application to waiver of defense
clauses in credit cards is the liability of a cardholder for the unau-
thorized use of his card. In the cases dealing with this issue, the card
issuer-holder contract provided that the liability for charges incurred
while the card was lost be placed on the holder until he had given
notice of loss to the issuer. It is significant that in two of these cases,"
Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.," and Diners' Club, Inc. v.
Whited," the relationship between the merchant and the issuer was
characterized as that of assignor-assignee. The Williams case was de-
cided in favor of the cardholder. In the course of its opinion, the
court stated:
If these dealers were independent contractors and not agents
of appellant, it necessarily follows that they were assignors
of the forged invoices upon which appellant seeks to recover
in this suit. These invoices, which were duly assigned by the
respective dealers to appellant, were not negotiable instru-
82 U.C.C.C. § 3-104.
33 U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
84 For cases involving pre-Code law, see Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967) ; Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
35 - Corm. — — Aid — (1969).
38 Id. at —.
87 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960), was the first case to
articulate the assignment theory and held in favor of the cardholder on a negligence
theory. The court construed the risk-shifting clause as a type of guarantee rather than
the direct obligation of the cardholder. As such it was an "essentially gratuitous" one
since the only benefit to the cardholder was the convenience of the card's use. Since
the law favors gratuitous sureties, the court implied a duty of care on the indemnitee-
issuer to protect the guarantor-holder. Id. at 426, 349 P.2d at 249.
88
 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
89
 Civil No. A10872 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 6, 1964).
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ments. . . . It is well settled that the assignment of a non-
negotiable instrument passes the rights of the assignor sub-
ject to all defenses that would be available if the assignor
brought suit direct on the instrument • . . . It follows that
appellant took the invoices subject to all equities and de-
fenses existing between [the holder] and the various dealers,
although appellant may well be a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice of such equities or defenses."
In Diners' Club, Inc. v. Whited,'" the court once again found for
the cardholder. Since the issuer, by virtue of its contract with the mer-
chant, was not obligated to purchase forged invoices, the court rea-
soned that the issuer could not claim damage." The court, moreover,
characterized Diners' Club as the assignee of the merchant's rights
and, as such, subject to the cardholder's defenses against the mer-
chants."
As noted above, the effect of section 9-206 is to allow a con-
sumer to contract away his defenses which ordinarily could be as-
serted against an assignee. In other words, the parties to the sale can
by agreement impart the legal characteristics of a negotiable instru-
ment to a sales slip which would otherwise be non-negotiable." In
Williams and Diners' Club, the waiver of defense issue was not liti-
gated. If the contracts had contained a waiver of defense provision,
or if the matter had been raised by the pleadings, then the issue of
applying the rationale of section 9-206 would have been presented.
As the above quoted portion of the Williams opinion indicates,
the court felt that since Gulf was the assignee of a non-negotiable in-
strument, it was immaterial whether these merchants were agents or
independent contractors. It is submitted that, had there been a waiver
of defense clause in this card contract, the fact of independent op-
eration would have been material," since the negligence of these mer-
chants would not have been necessarily imputable to Gulf," and since
the waiver clause would have imparted negotiability to the sales slips.
On the facts of Williams, the issuer might have prevailed since negli-
45 208 Ark, at 367, 186 S.W.2d at 793.
41 Civil No. A 10872 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 6, 1964).
42 The court said
voluntary payment is not damage. The cardholder has not agreed to pay for
money which Diners' Club voluntarily pays to promote its own goodwill among
merchants. That is promotion, not damage. It should be charged to that account.
Id. at 6.
43 Id.
44
 See U.C.C. $ 9-206, Comment I. For a complete discussion of the assignee
theory, see Bergsten, Credit Cards—A Prelude to The Cashless Society, 8 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 485, 509-13 (1967).
45 With respect to bank-issued credit cards, it should be pointed out that the
member merchants are always independent of the issuer and that, unlike oil company
cards, a waiver of defense clause is invariably part of the issuer-cardholder contract.
96 Negligence, a personal defense, is waivable under U.C.C.
	
3-305(1).
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gence of the merchant is the type of defense" which is waivable un-
der the rationale of section 9-206.
In any event, the characterization of the three party credit card
transaction in these cases in the same terms as a retail installment
sales contract is in itself significant, for it may indicate a judicial
willingness to apply similar policy considerations when deciding the
enforceability of waiver agreements in bank-issued credit cards. How-
ever, most courts would undoubtedly consider this decision a proper
legislative function. Viewed as such it becomes immediately apparent
that most jurisdictions would enforce these agreements against card-
holders since the majority of states now enforce these agreements
against consumers in the context of retail installment sales.
IV. LEGISLATIVE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Section 9-206 anticipates that a state's legislative policy with
respect to preserving the rights of consumers may be expressed either
through the courts or through its legislatures." Up to now only a
few courts have exercised this prerogative to deny efficacy to waiver
agreements in retail installment sales." However, at least 12 legis-
latures have enacted statutes which purport to protect consumers
against the claims of assignees." These statutes take two forms: some
absolutely prohibit the use of negotiable notes in consumer transac-
tions,51
 while others provide that subsequent holders of a negotiable
note taken in connection with a consumer sale are subject to any de-
fenses that a buyer may have by virtue of the original sale transac-
tion.52 These states, at least by implication, would deny effect to that
47 In the Williams case, for instance, the negligence of the merchants was manifest:
the lost card had been issued to a trucking firm and the limitation "Good for Trucks
Only," had been typed on the card. One of the firm's drivers had mistakenly left the
card in a gas station whose attendant misappropriated it to his own use for some 90
days. Many of the merchants who honored the card knew that the attendant had
wrongfully come into its possession, but nevertheless sold to him and in some instances
falsified the sales slips. 280 Ark. at 364, 186 S.W.2d at 792.
48 U.C.C. § 9-206(1), Comment 2.
45
 See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) ; Quality Fin. Co. v. Hur-
ley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, —
Conn. A.2d — (1969).
50 Cal. Civ. Code § 1810.7 (West Supp. 1968) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4342 (Supp.
1968) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 476-18(c) (1968) ; Mass. Geri. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12 C
(Supp. 1969) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 147 (1964) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(1)
(McKinney 1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A § 2-404(1) (Sum). 1969) ; P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 10, § 748 (Supp. 1968) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-37-6 (Spec. Supp. 1968); Utah
Code Ann. tit. 70B § 2-404(1) (Supp. 1969) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1969);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 64.14.020 (Supp. 1968).
51
 Cal. Civ. Code § 1810.7 (West Supp. 1968) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4342 (Supp.
1968) ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-18(c) (1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255 § 12 C
(Supp. 1969) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(1) (McKinney 1962) ; P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
10, § 748 (Supp. 1968).
52
 Md. Code Ann. art. 83, § 147 (1965) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Arm. § 6-27-6 (Spec. SuPP-
1968) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, 2455 (Supp. 1969); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.020
(Supp. 1968).
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portion of section 9-206 which provides that signing a negotiable in-
strument and a security agreement is an implied agreement to waive
defenses."
Most of these same states have correlative statutes which deny
effect to express waiver of defense agreements in a retail installment
sales contract. At first glance this denial would seem a necessary cor-
ollary to implement the express legislative policy of that particular
state. But Rhode Island, for instance, while it requires that a note
taken in connection with a consumer transaction bear the legend
"non-negotiable consumer note,' has enacted no companion legisla-
tion denying to assignees the benefit of an express waiver of defense
clause." The question which immediately suggests itself is whether
this is consistent with an express legislative policy to protect con-
sumers.
Legislation which does not permit a consumer to waive his de-
fenses by implication (by signing a negotiable instrument and a se-
curity agreement)," but does allow the same consumer to expressly
contract away his right to assert claims against an assignee, is man-
ifestly consistent.' Freedom of contract is the most compelling pol-
icy argument advanced by financers in support of enforcing express
waiver of defense agreements. In the case of bank credit cards, what
issuers bargain for when seeking enforcement of these clauses is the
smooth flow of payments since the entire credit card collection system
is postulated on that assumption. Controversies over relatively minor
amounts produce a disproportionate increase in administrative costs.
Assuming that bank credit cards were never envisioned as a vehicle
to promote consumer bankruptcies, the only benefit accruing to the
holder of such a card is the convenience arising from its use." In-
deed a bank may never realize any financial gain directly from the
cardholder since he can avoid all charges by paying within 25 days.
Since a ban on the mailing of unsolicited credit cards by the federal
government seems to be imminent," the benefit of a card's conve-
nience will soon be available to a consumer only upon application.
It can be argued that a clause whereby a party in a far superior
§ 9-206(1).
59 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-27-6 (Spec. Supp. 1968).
55 See 3 CCH Consumer Credit Guide § 4350, at 47,014 (1969).
56 It should be noted that the issuer of a 3-party credit card must rely on an
express waiver clause since the memorandum sales slip utilized in a credit card transaction
is not negotiable. See generally §§ 3-103, 3-104.
57 The possibilities for frustrating a state's legislative policy would seem to inhere
only in the manner in which such an agreement was drafted and the circumstances
under which it was entered into. This would seem to be a subject for separate legislative
control.
58
 This rationale was articulated in Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d
243 (1960), see note 37 supra.
59
 S. 721, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), a bill to safeguard the consumer by requiring
greater standards of care in the issuance of unsolicited credit cards, passed the U.S.
Senate on April 15, 1970.
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bargaining position seeks to avoid liability for losses as against a per-
son with little bargaining power should be unenforceable as being
against public policy. The logical defect in applying this argument
to support the conclusion that waiver agreements in credit cards
ought not to be enforced is that the buyer is free to purchase the same
goods or services with cash, under another credit arrangement with
the merchant, or with the proceeds of a personal loan. As long as this
purchaser is free not to contract for the use of a consumer credit
card, freedom of contract would seem to indicate that banks and
cardholders should be allowed the benefit of their bargain.
A minority of states have refused to enforce express waiver of
defense agreements in retail installment sales." The policy reasons
underlying this choice are somewhat applicable to bank-issued credit
cards.' As previously stated, the waiver of defense issue is viable in
only a few situations. The first involves merchants, solvent or insol-
vent, who do not intend to satisfy their customers' claims, regardless
of their merits. These merchants usually operate in low income areas,
and because bank cards are apparently available to low income con-
sumers and usable in these areas,' public policy would probably dic-
tate against enforcement of waiver clauses. This is especially true
when the low income consumer is forced to continue his payments
to the bank, thereby diminishing his available funds to exact legal
satisfaction from the merchant.
The existence of unethical or insolvent merchants presents the
most compelling argument for the non-enforcement of waiver clauses,
but the argument becomes less compelling if bank cards are viewed
as national instruments of commerce, and the relationship between
merchant and issuer becomes increasingly tenuous. It has already
been suggested that a major reason for relieving a bank of a buyer's
defenses is that of cost, since the entire system is postulated on the
smooth flow of payments. But those who support the non-enforcement
of waiver agreements assert that if issuers cannot enforce claims aris-
ing out of substandard merchandise, they will ultimately weed out
the unethical merchants who are interfering with their administrative
machinery. While there is logic to this argument, its application to
credit cards could produce equally unfortunate results. Issuers can
simply increase the discount rate to these particular merchants who,
in turn, will pass it on to consumers in the form of increased costs.
Also, in view of the fact that most bank cards are now honored na-
60 See statutes cited at note 29 supra.
el For a discussion of all of the policy considerations concerning waiver of defense
clauses in retail installment sales, see Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in
Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 535, 549-553 (1967).
02 "[Travel credit] cards . . . . are issued to relatively high-income consumers, and
are used largely to charge airline tickets . . . and similar things. Bank cards are issued
largely to lower-income consumers, who use them mostly to charge purchases at retail
establishments, many of which are small." Wall Street J., Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 8
(Midwest ed.).
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tionally, it is perhaps somewhat unfair to make banks sureties for a
merchant's performance when the presentation of a card establishes
instant credit among an unlimited chdice of merchants.
The most vexing problem exists where both merchant and buyer
are engaged in a legitimate dispute over the quality or conformity
of the merchandise. One can only suggest that the issuer bank be en-
titled to the benefit of its contract and that the buyer be left to pur-
sue his remedy against the merchant as his agreement with the issuer
provided. The issue at the heart of the waiver of defense problem is
the buyer's loss of leverage against a merchant when the buyer agrees
not to assert his defenses against a bank. To the extent that this bar-
gain with the bank was fairly made, however, these agreements ought
to be enforced."
V. NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE POLICY
Although the retail installment sale and the consumer credit card
transaction are so similar as to raise almost identical policy issues,"
there is an essential difference. Whether the policy of a state favors
enforcement or non-enforcement of waiver of defense clauses in retail
installment sales contracts, the effects of such a policy are limited in
scope to that state. Experience has shown that a decision one way or
the other has virtually no effect on the availability of financing for
these contracts." Bank credit cards, on the other hand, have become
instruments of national commerce. It is submitted that the adoption
of a federal policy with respect to enforcing waiver of defense clauses
could have *found effects on the development of the consumer
credit card industry.
Virtually all of the banks involved in the credit card business
utilize one of two national licensing systems—BankAmericard or
Master Charge." Statistics indicate that Master Charge cards are
presently honored by a substantial number of merchants in 49 states
while BankAmericard is similarly accepted in 44 states. 67
 Both sys-
tems have formed regional "interchange" associations which are com-
prised of member banks who collectively finance and operate com-
puterized accounting centers."
Because of this widespread dissemination, bank credit cards are
83 The court in Union Oil Co. v. Lull would probably agree:
But the fact that there is a widespread misconception on the part of cardholders
as to their liability does not warrant us in rephrasing the contract to accom-
modate that misunderstanding. The plaintiff company was entitled to the terms
of its bargain with those who elected to use its credit cards, assuming of course,
as we have, that the bargain was fairly made.
220 Ore. 412, 421, 349 P.2d 243, 247 (1960),
04 See Felsenfeld, supra note 61, at 549-53.
85 Td. at 551.
co O'Neil 50A.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 57.
1002
CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS
responsible in part for inflationary trends in the economy. Merchants
who are forced to pay discounts ranging up to 6 percent to banks to
which they sell their accounts must necessarily raise their prices to
make up for this loss. If proportionate savings of up to 6 percent
were passed on to cash customers, no problem would exist and cash
transactions would be encouraged. This, however, is seldom the case,
as member merchants normally charge one price for their goods.
It has been the hallmark of the past decade to champion the
cause of the consumer, and such efforts are praiseworthy. But it may
not be the credit card consumer who is in need of protection. In view
of the price discrimination which the large scale use of credit cards
inflicts upon noncardholders, and in view of the undesirable effects
which such discrimination has on the economy in general, it is sub-
mitted that it is from the point of view of the cash consumer that the
waiver of defense problem should be approached as it applies to bank
issued cards.
In view of the strong possibility that bank credit cards will be-
come a major national medium of exchange," it is more than likely
that federal legislation will be required to regulate these transactions.
It is submitted that, with respect to the policy issues raised by the
waiver of defense problem, a uniform federal credit card statute
should include the following provisions: (1) standards for the con-
tent and conspicuousness of waiver clauses so as to preclude any
misunderstanding by the card applicant concerning the effect of the
clause; (2) requirements that merchants participating in a national
credit card plan give effect, in both their advertising and in their
charges, to the price differential between a credit card and a cash sale;
and (3) a provision which would deny to a card issuer or a member
bank the benefit of a waiver of defense agreement to the extent that
either involved itself in the advertising or promotion of the goods of
their participating merchants.
With respect to the first of these provisions, by guaranteeing the
understanding of a card applicant that he is contracting away his
ability to exert leverage against a merchant to compel proper per-
formance by withholding payment, one preserves the freedom of the
card issuer and applicant to contract. Analogous to the Truth-in-
Lending Law requiring full disclosure of credit terms, the issuer
should be required to execute an agreement with the cardholder
clearly indicating the nature and effect of the waiver of defense
clause. An applicant who executed such an agreement can be pre-
sumed to have considered the convenience of the card's use as a fair
exchange for the loss of potential leverage against a merchant.
The second provision addresses itself to the problem of national
inflationary price discrimination resulting from the large scale use of
09 Although credit cards are presently responsible for only 2% of today's $98.2
billion in consumer debt, some experts believe that they will ultimately become the
dominant medium of exchange. Id. at 58.
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credit cards. The effect of such a price differential and disclosure re-
quirement would be to prevent a merchant from passing along prices
inflated by the amount of discount which he must pay the card issuer
to cash purchasers. The effect of requiring this price disclosure and
price differential should, when combined with a card applicant's clear
understanding of his waiver of defense agreement, inhibit the unfet-
tered growth of the credit card industry and effect a stabilizing of
the inflationary price trend attributable to credit cards.
The third suggested provision would be responsive to the basic
problems resulting from the advertising and promotion of goods by
card issuers. Since the effect of a waiver of defense clause in either
a retail installment contract or a credit card transaction is to impart
negotiability to what might otherwise be non-negotiable instruments,
section 9-206 requires that an assignee of such an instrument (in the
credit card sale, the imprinted transaction slip) must take his claim,
"in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense . . . ." 7° To
the extent that card issuers encourage cardholders to patronize cer-
tain merchants, participate in common advertising with the mer-
chants, or participate in "piggyback advertising" 71 by promoting
goods or services with materials included along with the monthly bill-
ing statement, the issuers should be held to answer for the non-con-
forming performance of those merchants or products and take those
accounts subject to the claims of consumers.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the hesitancy of the individual states to enact compre-
hensive legislation with respect to bank-issued credit cards is a recog-
nition that the use of these cards raises more than local problems.
Indeed, the characterization of the three party card relationship.as an
assignment of accounts ignores the fact that it is a hybrid relation-
ship, capable of many characterizations," and is unique. The utiliza-
tion of local retail installment sales statutes to remedy the problems
raised by these cards is not an acceptable alternative for the eco-
nomic uniformity desirable in the solution of commercial problems
that are essentially national in scope.
The continued rise in credit card sales underscores the need for
uniform federal legislation. It is submitted that an integral part of
such legislation should include a general license to enforce waiver of
defense agreements, but subject to the safeguards suggested. A uni-
lateral prohibition against enforcing such clauses, while ostensibly
protecting cardholders, would serve only to make the card contract
70 U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
71 See South, supra note 28, at 237.
72 It has been suggested that the 3-party credit card incorporates the character-
istics of many relationships: (1) an assignment from the merchant; (2) the holder's
direct promise in consideration of the merchant's extension of credit; (3) the issuer's
status as a "payor bank" under Art. 4 of the U.C.C.; and (4) the issuer's status as
issuer of a letter of credit under Art. 5 of the U.C.C. See Bergsten, supra note 44, at 509.
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more desirable and encourage an obviously inflationary trend. En-
forcement of these agreements, with companion price disclosure pro-
visions, would curtail that trend and eliminate price discrimination
against cash customers.
ROBERT F. MCLAUGHLIN
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